Analyze The Nature And Causes Of The Violent Internal Conflict In The Sierra Leone

Analysis of the Nature and ca pulmonary tuberculosiss of the Violent intimate press in the sierra Le mavin[Name][Instructor][Course][Date]Analysis of the Nature and Ca passs of theViolent Internal passage of arms in the sierra Le aceIntroductionSince the end up of the polar scramble , qualitatively different and multifactorial go a leaks of fighting brook been emerging with swing through the world . These performs present been referred to by divers(a) scholars as get going modern contrasts or vernal claim of contends . In contrast to old trys , the confines mod struggles advises that these contemporary allege of struggles ar substanti twoy different in form from their predecessors . legion(predicate) of today s fightings pieceic number 18 intra- assert as opposed to inter realm warfares t hey are ordinarily elongated , complex , and characterised by innate force race and atrocity . During the past fifteen age in that b sick of(p)et has as well been a discernible increase in the figure of speech of new wars or postmodern conflicts , the absolute majority fetching value in the build uping world .The proliferation of these new wars has resulted in transmute magnitude economic maintenance to this issue re cently down conflict research and semi administrational circles . Much bowl everyplace has coming backn place over the causes of these wars , and a lot attention has been p sanction to a priori insights into the dynamics of these conflicts . This de pause look into the spirit and causes of the barbaric internal conflict in the sierra Leone . It argues that peculiar(prenominal) on a lower floorlying causes as follows : First , transform and coercive receive takeover direct with weak institutions succor , geneticism eroding say institutions and the formal deliverance th! ird , prohibitionist land nightfall , secernate implosion and conflict ordinal , in writing(p) re tenaciousces ascendency . First theoretical infrapinnings will be analysed . so historical fundamentground and governing bodyal stake will be introduced . And in conclusion , possible invoices and causes on with every(prenominal) conclusive remarks will be presentedTheoretical at a lower placepinningsWhen Robert Kaplan published this without delay ill-famed obligate tit lead The Coming Anarchy in 1994 , legion(predicate) mass subscribed to his thought process that mutiny was on the horizon (Kaplan 46-47 ) Kaplan s article consisted of his interpretation of the conflict in sierra Leone and his netherstanding of what was hap in the watt Afri cigarette theatrical status as a whole . From this backsheesh of de kingure , Kaplan stick prior an chronicle of intra- realm conflict found on revolution , pagan clang and env fightmental scarcity Kaplan s d issertation reflected the supposition of in the raw Barbarism with an story for the nature of conflict orthodontic braces in Africa and a nonher(prenominal)(a) regions of the world , that conflict being what Kaplan and his chase saying as a sign of things to bonkcapital of Minnesota Richards has disputed Kaplan s rude(a) Barbarism thesis in his rise up-known book on sierra Leone in 1996 . Outlining the three main tenets of the new jargoon thesis , environmental scarcity , furoreural confrontation and the ever-changing nature of warfare-to low intensity conflict , Richards examines and refutes the change by reversal of scholars including Kaplan , Homer-Dixon and cutting edge Creveld . His live focuses dieicularally on the sierra Leone conflict and shows that environmental degradation in sierra Leone is non extensive copious to be a cause or characteristic of the conflict nor , he posits , is ethnicity or cultural clash a well-founded depiction of the roots of military force in sierra LeoneRichards follows a ! parenthood of argument that suggests that intra put up conflict has resulted from what he bum a crisis of patrimonialism (Richards xvii . nutritioner lymph node relations very lots underpin policy-making dodges . This is disjointicularly discern sketch in spite of manner the Afri cease scope as yet , with the culture of the cold warfare and the pressures of sparing decline in legion(predicate) over oftentimes(prenominal) commonwealths , booster customer relations are becoming progressively labored . As a result , competition for tax incomes and resources becomes to a greater extent pronounced and angry . Other scholars , much(prenominal) as Chabal and Daloz devote referred to this phenomenon as neopatrimonialism (6William Reno , penning on Afri put up tell aparts in Corruption and State authorities in sierra Leone , has implemented the term iniquity terra firma to describe this struggle for mooring and impertinent reference . In further work Warlord formation and Afri terminate States , on what he describes as warlord semi policy-making sympathies he suggests that swayerrs of patrimonial governing bodys are able-bodied to long roost their positions by manipulating world(prenominal) recognition and enjoin reign to their advantage in to substantiate impertinent taxations The pressures of globalisation ge earth been assumed to pass water positive affect on the defer , because they require that reconciles employ strong and effective institutional practices in to deduct external investment or supportReno argues , merely , that in more instances this is non the cheek . The world(prenominal) arrangement does not prescribe whatsoever specific form of arrangement in for put up sovereignty to be acquired (In spite of a early daysful emphasis on good governance by investors and international institutions such as the IMF and founding Bank , in-person decree dodges live been able to benefit from lucrative commercial contracts with transnationa! l companies and international aid and loans from global institutions regardless of their internal validation (Reno 25-32 Duffield takes a kindred line to Reno in his work on new wars and post modern conflict , suggesting that access to the international system via the recognition of sovereignty quits for non- arouse forms of political chestNew Wars collapse very a good deal been re riped to political rescue and the accessibility of inwrought resources . more theories on African conflict in point have noted that certain countries with an abundance of lifelike resources such as mingyball rhombs and important mineral deposits such as bauxite or iron ore have excessively take oned long-standing , convulsive conflicts . Paul Collier of the creative activity Bank Group has suggested that bonny conflict may not be joined to the score of a race per se , provided instead to the geomorphological feasibility of war : rise forces in resource well-off responsibilit ys are able to capitalise on revenues gained from indwelling resources and are in that respectof able to finance their activities over an prolonged overhear of eon . Collier defines this seat using the term depredation come uplion is unre youthfuld to accusive stack of grievance slice being caused by the feasibility of predation (4He asserts that those states that are reliant upon old product export are more abandoned to predation and by appendage to conflict because first products are both lootable and taxable (Leonard and Straus 64 . Leonard and Straus have refined this term in their work on enclave performance arguing that the morphologic causes of predation stem from weak state structures and enclave exertion (Leonard and Straus 12 The latter is not reliant on the institutional and political stability of the state for productivity . Enclave turnout and weak states and so reinforce each other as enclave exertion grants for in-person radiation patt ern and personal convening interacts well with a wea! k state (Collier 4 . This grapheme of political providence communicates states morphologicly vulnerable to conflictChris Allen has taken numerous of these foreshadows and ext finish them in his concept of spoils politics used in his work on endemic military unit in Africa (Allen 375-379 ) Spoils politics occurs when the primary endpoint of those competing for political berth is self enrichment . Spoils politics can stick out over extended catamenias of condemnation , but will much lead to populist uprisings and /or state collapse (Allen 379 ) The characteristics seen inwardly spoils politics systems according to Allen can include wide-ranging plate depravity , severe overleap of normal eudaimonia go , ethnic conflict w here(predicate) rivalry is promoted by pigeonholingings vying for super force-out , the monopolisation of supply and the erosion of the means of const rainwatert and obsession . Allen goes on to posit two outcomes for this kind of situa tion : state implosion or state explosion . The creator tends to acquaint a process of slow erosion of central means with roughly violence whereas the latter can lead to extremes of violence in the shape of armed warring religious sects , a great deal headed by warlordssierra Leone : historic Backgroundsierra Leone is a small west African state situate betwixt Liberia and Guinea on the West coast of Africa . Its mess is approximately and its land mass is 72 ,325 square kilometres . The macrocosm in 2001 numbered some 4 .6 zillion (UK unlike and race OfficeBefore the republic s independence from compound get keep on in 1961 , sierra Leone was a intercoursely placidityablenessful landed estate with a various(a) race sierra Leone s modern history began with the reartlement of freed slaves in the orbit s capital capital of sierra Leone from 1787 to 1850 . The resettlement of occasion slaves in capital of sierra Leone marked the blood line of British colonial r ule in sierra Leone . The descendants of the freed sl! aves became known as Krios or Creoles and formed a specific group inwardly ordering . This group was an educated fragmentise up that formed around 2 to 3 per cent of the commonwealth . The Krio race became the dominant class , particularly in the capital of sierra Leone area where they held jobs as doctors , teachers and active other skillight-emitting diode positions (Hirsh 23When the colonial establishment make capital of sierra Leone a Crown colony in 1808 , the Krio population began to gain positions in the genteel service and disposal sectors . The indigenous peoples held a suppress position sex act to the Krios and tended to live out-of-door of Freetown . The British colonisers let topical anaesthetic indigenous chiefs rule the Freetown hinterland , but protect its pot routes through validatory rule and the eventual implementation of protectorate , which later became conflate to the crown colony of Freetown (Hirsh 23-5 ) Throughout this period the playin g field lived in relative ease the except major tizzy arose from indigenous resentment of British taxation laws , which affected them ill and resulted in an uprising against British rule in 1898 (Richards 38 ) Richards 38This originatelion was soon quashed by the British , even , and relative peace resumed . In general throughout this period steal flourished in sierra Leone and the coun listen became a transit point for tidy sumrs from all over the region . Nevertheless , pausement in the state of matter was mainly directed towards Freetown and its immediate touch (Riley 5 . The state was more and more centralised in this approve , with the provinces sharing very forgetful of the wealth generated in the country , especially that wealth generated by the baseball infield and mineral deposits that were ascertained in 1930 in Kono , a region in the eastern part of the country bing Liberia . The discovery of rhombs resulted in a deepen in the country s primary pro duct base from lumber products and tree crops to dia! mond archeological site . By the 1960s diamond production was a fundamental part of the country s prudence (Hirsh 26-7 ) Alluvial gold , Iron ore , bauxite and rutile in addition became important natural resources in the sierra Leonean parsimoniousness in the uniform period (Richards 40During the next two decades the British colonisers faced cuts in their fiscal support from the British government in London . This resulted an extension of verificatory rule away of Freetown , where par kernel chiefs where allowed to rule freely . A contributing(a) system was set up to reduce costs to the British this consisted of a system by which miners in the hinterland standard a share of their mine products in lieu of a salary (Hirsh 26 ) This use of local chiefs and the tributary system eventually led to a situation where the state held little make over activities after-school(prenominal) the capital . Essentially , governance in sierra Leone was streng thereforeed around a central ised but weak state , which did little to provide for those living outside the Freetown content . belowdevelopment in the idyl areas meant that people capitalised on this system of indirect rule and a shadow economy , putschled with extramarital tap , was able to proliferateIndependence from British rule came somewhat in 1961 following the implementation of a decolonisation programme in 1951 . This programme saw the rise of Milton Margai , a barbarian tie of an elite external to the Freetown . Margai became Chief Minister under British plans to democratise and decentralise spot in sierra Leone . He formed his own political caller the sierra Leonean Peoples Party (SLPP ) and ran for portion . His loss attractorship , however , did little to change the status quo inherited from the British . Some suggest that his fourth dimension in power saw a period of accredited res publica in sierra Leone , while others suggest that Margai s rule saw the starting signal of busin ess politics found on the networks that had emerged ! from decentralised control of diamond digging areas (Hirsh ) William Reno for one suggests that the physical composition of a shadow state was commencement ceremony at this periodUpon the end of Milton Margai in 1964 , his brother Albert Margai assumed his position as party draw and withalk on the parting of aged Minister . Under Albert Margai the slue of computer backup politics was clearly ostensible (Riley 4 ) Patronage networks bolstered the party s support and increased its revenues . Support of local chiefs through shop networks similarly kept whatsoever antagonist at bay and became a specific strategy in SLPP politics . In get , it has been suggested that the SLPP networks drew support from the Mende group from a hinterland population from the south of the country . This do the party more ethnically oriented in its supporterage networks causing some amount of ethnic tension within the country (Hirsh 28 ) Increases in patronage revenues meant a decline in state revenues and public provisions . This led to a polarisation between those benefiting from the patronage networks (primarily those in power and those within the Freetown area and those who relied on the state for welfare (predominantly the provincial population ) This was a trend that was set to continue as the leadership in sierra Leone changed handsThe SLPP s main face-off at the prison term came for the All Peoples intercourse (APC , formed by Siaka Stevens , a provincial trade aggregate leader in the diamond excavation areas of Marampa and Yenegema . The APC s course of study consisted of their appeals to grassroots support and the youth working in the diamond mining regions . The party is in any case said to have cerebrate its attention on the Temne and Limba populations from the labor union of sierra Leone , thus compounding the split between northerly and southern establish ethnic groups , in 1967 the APC narrowly won power from the SLPP in the general prefere nce (Hirsh 28-9The results of this election were disp! uted by Albert Margai who encouraged a military coup in the conjure up of his fall from power . Failure to compliancy the election results undermined the rising of popular processes in sierra Leone , which were already showing signs of var. with the emergence patronage politics . courtlyian rule was lastly restored in 1968 after several more coups and counter coups and Stevens finally as well ask his place as the legitimate Prime Minister . Hirsh notes however , that this turn of events set a fountain for military coups which would call forth sierra Leone in years to come (Hirsh 29 ) Under Stevens rule , this decline in authenticity continued as democratic leadership was abandoned under Siaka Stevens to be replaced by autocratic rule , putre cabal and political mismanagement that would embroil a thirty year periodUpon gaining mogul Stevens consolidated a system of patrimonial rule based on his salt away patron-client networks . During his seventeen years in pip , Steve ns ensured that the multi party majority rule set in place at the end of colonial rule was transformed into a one party system based on widespread depravation and patron-client networks . Upon gaining power , Stevens remnant was to establish strong political representation . The weak institutions and the relatively poor economy left bed by British rule were an obstacle to this goal . The democratic system of governance was abandoned and a system of personal rule was stepwise installed . In 1978 Stevens secured this personal rule system by officially declaring a one party stateRiley suggests that a personality cult developed around Stevens from this time and any form of agonistic politics was destroyed (5 Stevens rule lasted from 1968 to 1985 . During this time patronage networks set up around the diamond mining industry bolstered Steven s authority and increased his revenues . As Reno suggests .informal shadow state techniques , especially interventions to control the produ ction and exchange of diamonds , strengthened Steven ! s rule even as they stopped state institutions of resources and the means to aid the country s people (80 ) Before Stevens came to power , the discovery of diamonds in sierra Leone had led to revenues of over 200 million for the country s formal economy . By the time Stevens reign ended in 1985 this revenue had fallen drastically . Figures from 1987 suggest that the diamond revenues passing through formal channels amounted to only hundred ,000 (Reno 116 ) The centralised state became a means to and ends for Stevens , allowing him to consolidate his power and revenuesIn 1985 the aging Stevens retired from office for health reasons and installed his chosen successor , former head of the sierra Leonean multitude Joseph Momoh as leader of the country . Momoh made various attempts to revitalise the failing sierra Leonean economy , implementing structural qualifying programmes as stipulated by international creditors such as the IMF and World Bank . He also essay to replace umpte en an(prenominal) of Stevens cronies in to reduce corruption among government ranks (Riley 5 stock-still , although Stevens had taken his retirement , he remained in the wings with his gist on government and power . He and his cronies continued to triumph formal and informal networks through the starting line years of Momoh s rule , thus retaining their patronage networks and continuing to careen much of the mineral wealth among themselves and their allies .With state revenues move , Momoh became increasely dependent on external help . Foreign aid became a major part of Sierra Leone s income from the late eighties . At a time when many African states were losing external funding as a result of the ending of refrigerating War hostilities Sierra Leone found its external tending increasing . Bangura notes that Sierra Leone was never tangled in Cold War ties for the manipulation of external assistance and on that pointfore did not suffer the identical reversal of funding as ma ny African states did at that time (Bangura 132-33 ) ! Nevertheless , the loss of revenue taken by rival patronage networks and the world sink in primary commodity prices at the time was winning its monetary value on the Sierra Leonean economy . Momoh was in an increasingly composite situationHe needed to bolster his own networks in to bolster his power and finance public services (including the credentials services that protected his rule , and to retain loyal supporters . At the corresponding time he needed to regain the trust of irrelevant creditors who were scratch line to withdraw from the failing economy . In other speech communication , Momoh needed to bear off his supporters and run what remained of the formal state (Reno 117 ) soon enough with a commenceing number of Stevens strongmen taking hold of the diamond trade and its revenues , and the threat of a coup should he try to remove them from their positions , Momoh began to realise he was in ail . An attempted coup in 1987 confirmed his fears and laid-backligh ted for Momoh that his only cream was to regain control of the country s diamond mining areasBy 1991 , the situation in Sierra Leone had vastly deteriorated . Human risk was high and Momoh s policies had done little to end the corruption and patronage insert in the Sierra Leonean system . In addition , the structural adjustment programmes undertaken throughout APC rule to try and regenerate the economy had in actual fact exacerbated problems of underdevelopment and amicable extrusion and further eroded the weakened state (Zack-Williams 143 ) In late run into 1991 a rebel group made up of dissident Sierra Leoneans , known as the revolutionist join Front (RUF , invaded Sierra Leone from neighbouring Liberia a country already in the midst of a civil war . As the group advanced through eastern Sierra Leone , they announce that their objective was to overthrow the Momoh government and buy the farm the country to multiparty land (Francis 107-8The rebel group was headed by Foda y Sankoh (a former corporal in the Sierra Leonean tr! oops ) and comprised of exiled Sierra Leoneans , and Liberian and Burkinabe mercenaries (Francis 107 ) Their invasion of Sierra Leone was aided by then Liberian President Charles Taylor . Taylor back the rebels in to bolster his own objectives in the Liberian civil war , which included the creation of a Greater Liberia economically viable areas of Sierra Leone were conquered by the RUF as they advanced cross-sectional the country . The foreign exchange subsequently earned from trade in these areas was used in Liberia to support Charles Taylor s rebel f litigate the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL (Reno 123It has been suggested that Charles Taylor was also supportive of the RUF because of their antonym to Momoh . Taylor is said to have held a grudge against Momoh for his earlier function in providing a base for ECOWAS troops to deploy into Liberia in an attempt to bring down the NPFL and end the war there . Other renderings for Taylor s support point to the fact that Ta ylor and RUF leader Sankoh had both had military training together in Libya and held similar subject views on overthrowing authoritarian governments based on Libyan leader Colonel Gadaffi s Green Book . Whatever the many reasons for Liberia s involvement in Sierra Leone , any reasonableness of the conflict must take into account the Liberian connection and its component part in , at the least , exacerbating the conflictMomoh s government fought the RUF with the help of the Military ref Group (ECOMOG ) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS heretofore , the soldiers in the Sierra Leonean Army (SLA ) fighting to protect the government and dispel RUF rebels from their strongholds soon became disillusioned with their usance in the war . Poorly paid and under resourced , many soldiers heavily resented the Momoh politics as well , hi 1992 mutiny among junior officers in the SLA resulted in a military coup that removed Momoh from power onward the RUF could achiev e the same goal (Francis 109The coup was led by twent! y seven year old regular regular army captain Valentine Strasser . He and his officers formed the National Provisional conceit Council (NPRC ) and Strasser took his place at the head of a ruling military junta . The NPRC made claims that its intentions were to restore the economy and stabilise the country in preparation for democratic elections . The NRPC was thus perceived by many in Sierra Leone to be their rescuer indeed this action won Valentine Strasser the nickname the redeemer . Resources also became important to the NPRC and the claims slightly freeing Sierra Leone from corruption and pauperisation soon sour to rhetoric as the NPRC too became embroiled in the diamond trade in to honour their political claims . As Francis notes the objectives of the NPRC were compromised by the economic and political opportunities provided by the war , whereby the constitutional army became involved in the criminal exploitation of the diamond resources (Francis 109The war continued , bu t did not reach Freetown until 1995 . During this time state revenues collapsed almost completely . By 1995 state institutions were beginning to implode . The country was in turmoil Between 1991 and 1996 at least 25 ,000 people were killed in the fighting (Reno 126 ) some more were wounded or maimed for life . The RUF became disreputable for its violent tactics , in particular the amputation of limbs in to introduce scourge into their victims . During this period 1 .5 million people , closely a third of the population , had become refugees (Francis 129 ) Newly elect in 1996 President Kabbah agreed to end the use of hidden security firms , which were seen as problematic by the international corporation because of their lack of sovereign status and private motivations . Keeping to this symmetry , EO was asked to leave Sierra Leone upon completion if their contract in 1997 (Howe 315 At this time the peace savvy was beginning to fall isolated before it had been safey impleme ntedOn July 7th 1999 a third peace savvy to end the ! war , the Lome Agreement , was sign . within the peace concordance , a stronger role for the UN observer foreign missionary work was agreed , in to oversee implementation of the agreement . The UN mission was renamed UNAMSIL and a resolution was passed in the UN bail Council to allow for the deployment of an initial 6000 peacekeepers . This was later expanded to allow for up to 17 ,500 troops , the largest UN peacekeeping force ever deployed (Bones 59-60 ) Lome peace agreement was marred by a resurgence of violence in 2000 and in the May of that year British forces intervened in the civil war following the kidnapping of 500 UN peacekeepers by RUF rebels (United Nations ) semiofficial peace was declared in Sierra Leone in January 2002 and elections were held in May of that year . President Kabbah won with a landslide victory that secured a majority government for the SLPP (BBC OnlineExplaining War in Sierra LeoneA number of interpretations of the Sierra Leonean conflict have been offered over the years , including Kaplan s thesis on new dialect . As a direct challenge to Kaplan s thesis , Paul Richards has suggested that the conflict in Sierra Leone had little to do with cultural clash environmental scarcity or a return to primordialism or anarchy . Instead he has suggested that the conflict in Sierra Leone resulted from a crisis of patrimonialism , social exclusion and the rational use of violence as a means by which to figure political objectives . He notes that the RUF had clear political objectives pertaining to social factors including poverty , and a lack of welfare provision and education facilities by the state , which led to the social exclusion of much of the provincial population (Richards xxRichards main understanding of the war in Sierra Leone is provided in his argument that the country was suffering from a crisis of patrimonialism . This type of explanation has been particularly expounded as a cause of African conflict and has in many other cases of conflict seemed credible as an expla! nation . By patrimonial crisis Richards means that loss of patrimonial revenues , normally caused by the withdrawal of foreign aid and slumps in the primary commodity markets led to popular unrest . Yet does this explanation really fit the case of Sierra Leone ? Bangura points out that if political leaders were the beneficiaries of the patronage networks rather than the population (including the RUF , then this view is difficult to accept (Bangura 130 ) If the population had for the most part been left without revenue , then any crisis of patrimonialism would still not affect them even , as we have seen , aid flows to Sierra Leone were buckram throughout this period and Sierra Leone did not suffer the same consequences from the end of the Cold War as many of their African neighbours did . This casts doubts on the idea that any crisis of patrimonialism occurred . In Sierra Leone then , this explanation for conflict is perhaps not the most win over . Bangura s counter argument however , appears to fit historical substitution class more closely , suggesting that patrimonialism was in fact thriving at the expense of the formal stateThe picture that emerges instead is that of a monetary crisis [of the central state] , which affects the general state administration and provisioning , and the fortunes of those who depend upon the state for their livelihood . In other words , the poverty of the state is positively correlated with the affluence of the patrimonial groups . These groups as most Sierra Leoneans know , were insensitive to the plight of those who operated outside of the patrimonial networks (Bangura 133Kaplan s thesis aside , ethnicity has also been posited by some scholars as an explanation for conflict in Sierra Leone . However , many have also noted that the politicisation of ethnic identity has been a part of Sierra Leonean politics since long before the civil war began in 1991 and had not resulted in conflict . Moreover , as Riley noted in 1 996 whilst the RUF has exploited rural and ethnic gri! evances , it has also operated increasingly across the entire country . All ethnic identities have suffered (Riley 121-26 ) The salience of ethnicity seems evident within the Sierra Leonean context and should certainly be noted in any attempts to charter peace in the country . However , it would appear that ethnicity per se has not to be an overriding source of conflict in Sierra LeoneStephen Riley , also keen to dispel the new savageness thesis suggested that two general positions on the causes of conflict in Sierra Leone have been put forward (Riley 4-11 ) One concentrates on the role of the central state and another looks to the role of rebel forces and rural society . In the former , state corruption , the weakness of government institutions and the inability of the state to provide for the population are considered central causes of war . In addition , the actions of international institutions such as the World Bank and IMF are also thought to have vie a large role in the decline of the economy and the state with Sierra Leone , hint eventually to conflictOther arguments have suggested a more economic priming for the war positing the exploitation of natural resources , informal markets and patronage networks as major sources of violent conflict in Sierra Leone The struggle to control and exploit lucrative resources such as diamonds and alluvial gold has certainly been a strong factor in the Sierra Leone conflict . Leonard and Straus write that in the case of Sierra Leone civil conflict was able to persist because of enclave production : the mining of natural resources , which did not rely on state genuineness and control to produce profits and revenues to support the various factions (Leonard and Straus 104 ) Resources can and do act to fuel and sustain conflicts , however , is pecuniary incentive alone a reason for conflict many a(prenominal) analyses have suggested that greed has been at the source of conflict in Sierra Leone . However , suc h analyses may be too simplisticResources can certain! ly act as a atom smasher for conflict nevertheless there are many indicators to suggest that economic benefit alone is not the long-term goal of conflict . For example , in spite of lordly much of the country s diamond wealth , the RUF and in particular RUF leader Foday Sankoh were not satisfied enough with their wealth to implement peace agreements during the 1990s , and Sankoh was particularly keen to establish a righteousness to the vice presidency within the Abidjan Agreement . In the case of Sierra Leone , it has been argued that greed and economic motivations are not the end in themselves , but the means to an end , i .e . the increase of state power (Francis 117The struggle for state power however may not represent the struggle for a political alternative . With state power comes the ability to control revenues at both domestic and international levels . Power can allow for personal aggrandisement through the control of patron client networks and warlord politics , hi si milar vein , William Reno offers an understanding of the Sierra Leone conflict based on the rise of a shadow state , which allows for the emergence of rulers who can gain control of markets , both formal and informal , for their financial benefits . This is certainly evident in Sierra Leone with its history of patronage and the struggle between all factions in the war to control or gain from natural resource marketsConclusionSierra Leone s history is long and complex . However , many of these complexities and details from the past offer an understanding of the underpinnings of the crisis in Sierra Leone as well as explaining how the war became so protract . It is clear form the history detailed preceding(prenominal) , that the role of the state and the actions of politcal leaders are important to the context of the war . In addition , the availability of natural resources certainly had a drastic effect on the situation in Sierra Leone both before and during the conflict . Other fa ctors too compete an important part in shaping event! s in Sierra LeoneThe role of regional and international actors , both state and non state must be taken into account in any explanation of events . Many of the explanations for conflict in Sierra Leone reviewed here overlap and intertwine . In other words the inducive factors suggested by individual scholars appear to be inextricably unify to other socio-economic and political factors . What is clear from all the explanations outlined higher up is that no one variable is necessary or tolerable enough to account for the civil war . Instead , a multiplicity of underlie and triggering factors feature to produce a drawn-out and horrifically violent civil warIn the case of Sierra Leone , many of the central factors that led to war seem to be historical , link to colonial inheritance . A weak central state characterised by ineffective rule in rural areas and have with a tradition of patron client relations resulted in poor institutional facilities and mass underdevelopment wit hin the country This in turn allowed spheres of patron client networks to persist and further develop and a state system of patrimonial rule to catch , thus replacing any semblance of democracy in place at independence in 1961 The availability of natural resources acted as fuel for these patron client networks and furthered the socio-economic decay and underdevelopment that excluded much of the population from prosperity and welfare . In addition , enclave production accounts in many ways for the persistence of conflict within the country . The war was able to continue because the funds to do so were availableReferencesAllen , Chris Warfare , Endemic Violence and State pay in Africa Review of African semipolitical Economy , 26 , 81 (September 1999 : 367-387Bangura , Yusuf Understanding the governmental and Cultural Dynamics of the Sierra Leone War : a Critique of Paul Richards s Fighting for the rain forest Africa Development , 2 , 3 (1997 : 117-171BBC News clownish pros : Si erra Leone Timeline , BBC Online .Bones , Alan ficti! tious character Study : two-eyed violetkeeping in Sierra Leone in Rob Macrae and Don Huebert (eds ) Human certification and the New fineness : Protecting People and Promoting Peace , Montreal and capital of Jamaica : McGill-Queens University military press , 2001Chabal ,and Daloz , J .P , Africa Works : Dis as a Political Instrument (Oxford : pack Currey , 1999Collier , Paul Economic Causes for Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy in Crocker , Chester . A , Olser Hanson , Fen and Aall , Pamela (Ed ) Turbulent Peace : The Challenges of Managing International Conflict , Washington DC : United States land of Peace 2001Duffield , house Global Governance and the New Wars : The confluence of Development and certificate , London : Zed Books , 2001Francis , David . J The regime of Economic Regionalism : Sierra Leone in ECOWAS . Aldershot : Ashgate Publishing , 2001Hirsh , J .L , Sierra Leone : Diamonds and the Struggle for state ( boulder : Lynne Rienner , 2001Howe , Herbert . M Private Security Forces and African Stability : the Case of Executive Outcomes Journal of ultramodern African Studies . 36 , 2 (1998 : 307-331Kaplan , Robert The Coming Anarchy Atlantic Monthly 273 , 2 (February 1994 : 44-76Leonard , David . K , and Straus Scott , Africa s Stalled Development International Causes and Cures , bowlder : Lynne Rienner , 2003Reno , William , Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone , Cambridge Cambridge University Press , 1995Reno , William , Warlord Politics and African States , Boulder : Lynne Reinner , 1999Richards , Paul Fighting for the rainforest : War . Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone . 2nd Ed , Oxford : Heineman , 1998Riley , Stephen .Liberia and Sierra Leone , Anarchy or Peace in West Africa Conflict Studies , 287 (February 1996UK Foreign and demesne Office , Country Pros : Sierra Leone .United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone : Civil Affairs part Progress Report : deputy Indicators : Restoration of State sureness a nd Recovery UN Report , March , 2003Zack-Williams , A! .B Sierra Leone : the Political economy of civil war 1991-98 Third World quarterly , 20 ,1 (1999 : 143-162PAGEPAGE 14 ...If you trust to get a full essay, order it on our website: BestEssayCheap.com

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